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Abstraction As a Basis
for the Computational Interpretation
of Creative Cross-Modal Metaphor ⋆
Sylvia Weber Russell
Department of Computer Science
University of New Hampshire
Durham, NH 03824, USA
swr@cs.unh.edu

Abstract. Various approaches to computational metaphor interpretation are based on preexisting similarities between source and target domains and/or are based on metaphors already
observed to be prevalent in the language. This paper addresses similarity-creating cross-modal
metaphoric expressions. It is shown how the “abstract concept as object” (or reification)
metaphor plays a central role in a large class of metaphoric extensions. The described approach depends on the imposition of abstract ontological components, which represent source
concepts, onto target concepts. The challenge of such a system is to represent both denotative
and connotative components which are extensible, together with a framework of general domains between which such extensions can conceivably occur. An existing ontology of this kind,
consistent with some mathematic concepts and widely held linguistic notions, is outlined. It
is suggested that the use of such an abstract representation system is well adapted to the
interpretation of both conventional and unconventional metaphor that is similarity-creating.

1

Introduction

The last couple of decades have seen an increasing number of computational approaches to processing
metaphor. By interdisciplinary consensus, this research has generally been implemented as processes
that map an expression in a source domain (domain of the metaphorically used concept) to an
interpretation in a topic- or target domain (domain of intended meaning). (Within-) physical-domain
metaphor, as in the war horse example The ship plowed [through] the sea/waves, received attention
early on [Russell, 1976]. Treatments that focus solely on physical-domain metaphor include those
by Wilks [Wilks, 1977] [Wilks, 1978] and Fass and Wilks [Fass and Wilks, 1983] and are discussed
in [Russell, 1986]. Fass [Fass, 1997], while presenting an extensive treatment of metaphor in the
context of literal, metonymic and anomalous expressions, also focuses mainly on physical-domain
metaphor.
This paper argues for the role of an abstract ontology in the interpretation of cross-modal
metaphor, with special attention to similarity-creating metaphor. Cross-modal metaphor extends
across “conceptual domains” (modes, levels), as in to quarry ideas, which involves extension from
a physical to a mental domain, in Encyclopedias are gold mines, which involves extension from a
control (possessive) domain to a mental domain, or the cadenza of his gymnastic performance, which
involves extension from a sensory (sound) domain to a physical domain.
The discussion begins with an indication of what is meant by similarity-creating metaphor and
how some of the major research on metaphor does not address it. Some notes on ontologies follow, as
well as observations on abstraction, including mathematical abstraction and its potential relevance
to an abstract natural-language ontology. A program that relies on an abstract ontology to address
similarity-creating metaphor is then outlined, with an explanation of components of the ontology.
⋆

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 5th International Workshop on Natural Language
Processing and Cognitive Science - NLPCS 2008

This description is followed by brief illustrations of relevant aspects of interpretations of verbal
and nominal metaphor. The paper concludes by noting that some other researchers have found it
necessary to extend their metaphor processing systems with (at least implicit) abstract ontological
components. This trend, along with interdisciplinary observations on abstraction, suggests the need
for attention to an abstract ontology in a metaphor processing system, at least if the system is
claimed to be explanatory.

2

Similarity-Creating Metaphor

With respect to metaphor, the word ‘creative’ is often used interchangeably with the word ‘novel.’ By
‘novel metaphor,’ some researchers refer simply to metaphors that their systems—or perhaps even
humans—have not previously encountered. Such metaphors may be based on representations that
capture similarities existing prior to use of the metaphor. By contrast, Indurkhya [Indurkhya, 1992]
presents evidence of the significant role of similarity-creating metaphors in cognition.
As Indurkhya points out, in many metaphoric expressions where verbs are used unconventionally—
some would say in a novel way, there is a pre-existing similarity. For example, in The sky is crying,
there is an easily recognizable similarity between crying (tears falling) and one of the few things
that fall from the sky (rain drops); the metaphor can be analyzed by comparison, though it also
suggests sadness. Similarity-creating metaphor, on the other hand, is characterized as change of
representation: “In instantiating the source concept network in the target realm, parts of the realm
are ‘grouped’ together and made to correspond to the concepts of the concept network. In this
process, the target realm is given a new ontology, and its structure, as seen from the more abstract
concept network layer, is changed” (p. 254).
Indurkhya acknowledges that the difference between suggestive similarity-based metaphor and
similarity-creating metaphor may be a matter of degree, i.e., degree of participation of the target
and source domains. That is, the closer the metaphor is to being similarity-creating, the more the
source ontology is imposed and the less the pre-existing target ontology remains. In this paper it
is assumed that cross-modal metaphor (which Indurkhya does not focus on) is in a sense always
similarity-creating, because the real-world details of source and target will always differ. For example,
in the metaphor, Encyclopedias are gold mines, there is little literal similarity between encyclopedias
and gold mines, or between reading and mining.

3

Approaches to Metaphor

Through metaphor, different source concepts may be used to structure the target in different
ways. Lakoff and Johnson [Lakoff and Johnson, 1980] recognize both the “conceptual metaphors”
(or “metaphor themes”) LIFE IS A JOURNEY and LIFE IS A GAME, and perhaps other “life”
metaphors. Thus similarity can be created by re-conceptualizations. While such conceptual metaphors
are certainly of theoretical interest, a problem for computational purposes is that they are categories,
without specifications of which components of the source domain of a word are extensible.
The early approach of Carbonell [Carbonell, 1980] [Carbonell, 1982] is based on the stored conceptual metaphors of Lakoff and Johnson. However, systems that rely only on stored conceptual
metaphors cannot interpret linguistic metaphors that do not fit any stored conceptual metaphor.
(To interpret The discussion scintillated do we need a DISCUSSIONS ARE STARS or perhaps a
DISCUSSIONS ARE SPARK PRODUCERS conceptual metaphor?) Also, the metaphoric nature of
the transferred properties themselves is not addressed. For example, the phrase ‘firmly supported,’
used in Carbonell’s example of the MORE IS UP conceptual metaphor, is simply applied to both
source and target domains without semantic analysis.
Hobbs [Hobbs, 1992] addresses metaphor without recourse to stored metaphors, using inferences
to express linguistic relationships. In his illustration he matches ‘send (a bill)’ in a Congress schema
to ‘pitch (a ball)’ in a baseball schema, and “proves” the correspondences between roles in the

two schemata. This metaphor is certainly novel, but Hobbs’s interpretation process is based on
existing similarities between the source and target schemata. His system apparently does not provide
metaphoric interpretations in cases where no appropriate schemata exist. The verb ‘pitch’ is defined
as ‘send’ plus certain unnamed differentiating conditions. It is not clear whether ‘send’ is a basic
representation component or one of many literal and metaphoric senses.
Approaches of other researchers that show some potential to address similarity-creating metaphors
are discussed at the end of this paper.

4

Ontologies

The term “abstract ontology” might be seen as an oxymoron, and it is, if an ontology is that which
purports to describe the “real world.” Wilks [Wilks, 2007], in dismissing the distinction between
traditional/classical and modern/AI-type meanings of “ontology” as unimportant for AI/NLP purposes, also rejects any claims that “cleaning up” given ontologies will result in any notable advances
in the field. This view (which I accept) is mentioned in order to emphasize that the focus in this
paper is only on the role that abstracted components can play in a computational metaphor interpretation system with attention to presumed cognitive components, and on what types of components
are needed and are peculiar to metaphor interpretation. While the ontology is explained below, the
intent is not to justify the exact form the individual components take. It is important, however,
that the ontology, being abstract, be relatively small and transparent, for purposes of evaluation
and revision.
A cross-modal metaphor-relevant ontology is based not on any objective reality, but on a certain
unconventional view of reality through language, which itself represents a conceptualization. A
perhaps noncontroversial observation of Quine [Quine, 1969] on the ontology of language would
seem to apply to abstractions from language (i.e., to an abstract ontology) as well—namely, that
differences between one person’s ontology and another may depend simply on how the ontologies are
“sliced” or how components are grouped; correspondences between ontologies will probably not be
one-to-one (cf. also Whorf [Whorf, 1956]. There is no claim in this paper, then, that the components
of the abstract ontology are universal, uniquely “correct,” or language-free; there is merely an appeal
to some parallelism to other disciplines and to a consensus of “reasonableness” by speakers of the
same language and others that are related to some extent. Neither is there speculation on the source
of the given ontology in developmental or evolutionary terms.
In cross-modal metaphor, any perceived or imposed similarity as mediated by the ontology is
abstract (in the conventional rather than strict use of that word); some considerations of abstraction
follow.

5

Abstraction

In abstraction, one representation is converted to another representation in which some details of
the source representation are dropped, but the underlying structure, or part of the structure, is left
unaltered. In a paraphrase of linguistic metaphor, the abstracted representation can be thought of as
an interlingua between the metaphor and its (more) literal translation. In a sense, any representation,
whether a mapping between real-world concepts and symbols or between those symbols and higherlevel symbols, is abstract. In the context of mathematics learning, Kaput [Kaput, 1989] defines
four interacting types of representation - 1) cognitive and perceptual, 2) explanatory representation
involving models, 3) representation within mathematics and 4) external symbolic representation,
such as a chip, which can be instantiated by many different objects and can thus be a generalization
or abstraction for cookies, baseball cards, dollars, etc. In natural language, similarly, the concept
underlying the word ‘object’ can be thought of as a generalization or abstraction for the mentioned
items; it is plausible that the cognitive components which relate to mathematical abstraction are
(or overlap with) those which structure linguistic metaphor. As it is being argued for an abstract

ontology for metaphor, a consideration of relationships between mathematical and abstract linguistic
components that might be included in such an ontology follow.
5.1

Mathematical Language

Mathematics education literature frequently refers to the power of mathematics to account for many
analogous situations through its abstract language. It is often difficult to characterize mathematical language and natural language independently in discourse, since mathematical concepts can
be embedded in natural language, not only in mathematical word problems, but in our everyday
language about situations. 1 For example, English can embed both explicitly numerical references,
such as ‘ten’ and ‘a dozen,’ and expressions that are mathematically relevant but not necessarily so intended, such as ‘the rest of them,’ ‘a slice of pizza,’ ‘altogether,’ ‘join,’ ‘more than,’ etc.
[LeBlanc and Weber-Russell, 1996]. The meshing of these languages corresponds to Kaput’s interaction between cognitive/perceptual and mathematical representations and suggests common ontological components. For example, an abstract PART concept can be realized in both mathematical
and nonmathematical language.
5.2

Reification as a Basis for Spatial Structuring

In mathematical language, arithmetic equations represent structures with numbers as abstractions
not only of sets of objects, but also of non-object concepts (as in ‘he fell twice’), and with operators
that relate these sets; the abstraction to numbers establishes the basis for the equation. Similarly, in
linguistic metaphoric extensions from the physical domain, nonphysical concepts may become abstract “objects,” allowing verbal concepts to “operate on” them. Reification (or “nominalization”)—
treating an action, relation or attribute as an “abstract object” in the form of a noun—is thus a
first step in the creation of this kind of metaphor. Expressed syntactically, reification is an instance
of the “abstract concept as object” metaphor [Russell, 1989], which has become integrated into
(some) natural languages as dead (frozen, assimilated) metaphors, i.e., metaphoric language usually
thought of as literal. Mathematical language and much of metaphoric language can thus be viewed
as sharing spatial grounding,2 suggesting that not only physical but also nonphysical verbal concepts
might be analyzed in terms of spatial structures.
To illustrate, the physical action underlying the verb construct ‘chase out/away (e.g., mosquitoes)’
can be extended to apply to conceptually different types of objects. In ‘chase away an idea,’ the
‘idea,’ which is a reification in a mental domain, is “taken away” from the thinkers of the idea; mathematically, to ‘chase away six mosquitoes,’ as in a word problem, may mean to subtract or “take
away” 6. In both cases, symbols are mapped from one domain to another through an abstraction
representing “leaving a state” (of thought or of the presence of the six mosquitoes).
Prepositions can also be interpreted metaphorically as well as mathematically if the head of
the prepositional phrase is reified. Figure 1 shows how the preposition ‘of’ can be understood linguistically as a metaphoric ‘part’ or quantitatively as ‘subtracted from.’ The extension of ‘of’ in
combination with syntactic reification or quantitative abstraction (middle level of the ellipses) provides the basis for metaphoric and mathematical expressions respectively as shown.3
Reification, then, enables the natural-language extension similarly as quantification enables the
mathematical extension.
Thus if we settle on a basic set of abstract components in terms of certain state configurations
and use them as the basis of abstract verb definitions applying to multiple domains, then these
1

2
3

See Cummins et al. [Cummins et al., 1988] for evidence of young children’s confusion about such embedded language.
See Section 8 for an alternative to this assumption.
See Brugman and Lakoff [Brugman and Lakoff, 1988] for a systematic treatment of extended senses of
prepositions.

e.g.,
1 subtracted-from 4
4-1

torpedo
hopes of players

math. expression (ML)

met. expression (NL)

hopes of players

one of four wheels

reif. attrib.
as object
players hope
[that]

met./math.
usage

quantified concept
as number
[<physobj1>]
of
[<physobj2>]

a wheel of a car

ABSTRACTION with

ABSTRACTION with

METAPHORIC EXTENSION

MATHEMATICAL EXTENSION

"literal"
usage

Fig. 1. Metaphoric and mathematical extensions of the preposition‘of.’

components can be considered to be extended in metaphor and to contribute to its interpretation
(see Section 8).
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An Ontology-Based Metaphor Analysis Program

MAP, a computational metaphor paraphrase program [Russell, 1976] [Russell, 1986] [Russell, 1992],
interprets a simple, partially metaphoric sentence in terms of a roughly equivalent paraphrase conventionally considered as “literal.” The most critical aspect of the program resides in the (abstract)
lexicon, where verbs and nominals are represented by components of an abstract ontology. For
verb-based metaphor, components representing a verb which serves as a metaphoric source concept
are interpreted in the target domain as indicated by the nominal concepts with which the verbal
concept is used. Thus for She chased away the thought, a mental domain is indicated by ‘thought,’
and the primitives underlying ‘chased away’ lead to a paraphrase including a phrase such as ‘voluntarily stopped thinking about.’ For nominal metaphor, the primitives underlying salient properties
or predicates [Russell, 1986] of the source nominal are transferred to the target representation.
Thus for Political movements are glaciers, the potentially extended predicates include components
representing slow change.
MAP treats dead metaphors and novel metaphors (whether similarity-based or similarity-creating)
in the same way, though of course dead metaphors and even some metaphors that are “alive” but
conventional could be defined directly in the lexicon for efficiency purposes. The focus of this discussion, however, is on MAP’s ability to interpret similarity-creating metaphors.
The assumption that natural language and mathematics share spatial structure, e.g., structure
in terms of objects and relations, suggests that 1) a small number of abstract descriptors that overlap with those of mathematics in being spatially based reflect some intuitive consensus of speakers
of the language with respect to the design of an ontology and 2) such spatially based structures
provide a framework for additional, qualifying primitives, some of which also correspond with mathematical concepts. The ontology described below consists of extensible components including spatial

structures, which represent the potential similarities between source and target, and domains, which
represent the differences.

6.1

Abstract Extensible components

The task of determining a set of extensible components of verbal concepts entails considering which
concepts speakers of a given language recognize in a literal meaning of a verb that allows them to
understand a metaphoric use of that verb, even if they have never heard it before. If much of our
language is spatially structured, we should be able to suspect some cognitive basis for components
in the abstract domain of mathematics (arithmetic, calculus, logic). Elementary physics concepts
applicable to a wide range of everyday physical situations can also be expected to play a representational role. The following structures and features either have a math-physical counterpart and/or
have a broad linguistic consensus.

Structures All verb structures are based on a STATE. The STATE may take the form of either the
existence of a nominal (OBJECT BE); the relation of a nominal in relation to other concepts (OBJECT AT LOCATION; or a (static or dynamic) attribute of a nominal (OBJECT BE <attribute>).4
These abstract STATE structures might be thought of logically as one- or two-argument predicates
or linguistically as unary or binary abstract case structures.5 In addition to negation (NOT), components may represent the beginning or end of a STATE, or transition through a space, which in
mathematical functions correspond to boundary points (limits) or a path between two points respectively. Any STATE structure can be an effect or result caused by an event or by an (animate)
AGENT. It is the result portion of the abstract structure of a verb involving causation that is
considered of primary salience and receives a domain specification. Verbs requiring representation
including other higher-level primitives, such as purpose, conjunction, temporal sequence, etc. have
not yet been included in MAP’s lexicon.

Features It is qualifiers and connotations that are often the point of a metaphor. These are
represented as abstract, “conceptual” features—more flexible than explicit categories and perhaps accounting for some of the fuzziness perceived in the concepts they apply to. These have
polarity or magnitude specifications as appropriate. As qualifiers of actions, features for action
verbs correlate with some mathematical descriptors: CONTINUITY, REPETITION (frequency)
and SPEED (rate). Verbs with quantitative attributes (e.g., ‘grow’), may have MAGNITUDE
and GREATER/LESS-than. VOLITION is a feature describing an actor. Responses of an experiencer (reader or hearer) of the metaphor have EVALUATION values (POSITIVE, NEGATIVE) and FORCE magnitude (HIGH, LOW). EVALUATION and FORCE correspond to Osgood’s
[Osgood, 1980] evaluative and potency factors—two of the three nonstructural factors (the other
being activity, refined in the action features above) he empirically determined to be extended in
metaphoric usage (see also Aarts and Calbert [Aarts and Calbert, 1979]). Various emotions are also
incorporated. Emotional states as real-world concepts are not “abstract” in the sense that NOT
or MAGNITUDE is. However, they are clearly extensible, though with varying intensity (the fear
experienced when one’s hope is torpedoed may not have the same intensity as that when one’s boat
is literally torpedoed).
4

5

Attributes, such as ‘red,’ ‘asleep’ or ‘hopeful,’ “fill in” specific properties of the world and are not necessarily considered “primitive.”
Abstract case structures are simpler than traditional case structures, since Fillmore’s [Fillmore, 1968]
dative and locative cases, for example, or Schank’s [Schank, 1975] “conceptual” Recipient and Direction
cases are combined in (abstract) LOCATION.

6.2

Conceptual domains

Conceptual domains are orthogonal to the extensible portion of the ontology. For cross-modal
metaphor, the specified domains are only those general, Aristotelian-like domains which, along with
the PHYSICAL (animate and inanimate), are thought of as human faculties: MENTAL, with subdomains intellect, attitude and will ; SENSORY, with sense-specific subdomains; and CONTROL,
with subdomains intrinsic (e.g., ‘talent’) and extrinsic (either control of physical concepts or control
of action possibilities dependent on others, such as ‘rights,’ ‘duties,’ etc.). The same categories are
used for nominals, with the addition of TIME and SPACE. This taxonomy within the ontology is
obviously breadth- rather than depth-oriented.
Every verb in the lexicon is assigned the conceptual domain in which it is thought to be literal.
The model allows a concept in any conceptual domain to be a source, though the source is more
often PHYSICAL. It is the difference between the conceptual domains of a verb and the OBJECT
of the structure that triggers cross-modal metaphor recognition.6
The small size and transparent organization of the set of extensible and nonextensible components allows the management of the ontology and the task of representation in terms of that ontology
to be feasible. Also, by defining words through the abstract components, we can note which components, when imposed on the target domain, positively or negatively affect the interpretation of
similarity-creating metaphors.

7

Interpretation

7.1

Constraints

MAP does not compare a source representation with a target; it is not similarity-based. Rather, the
abstract source representation is imposed, i.e., directly projected onto the target. However, source
representations cannot be imposed arbitrarily. There are some coherence constraints on interpretations to assure (as far as possible) that the expression makes sense metaphorically, i.e., is not
“anomalous,” indicating a probable mis-parse of the text containing the sequence being analyzed.
For example, when a transitive verb is used metaphorically with an object nominal in a different
conceptual domain, there are some abstract constraints (analogous to “selectional restrictions” on
nonmetaphoric language) that the object must satisfy. These constraints are realized in MAP as
abstract conceptual features of nominals. For cross-modal metaphor interpretation, these features
are fewer than literal semantic features of nominals, since many details of the nominal concept drop
out of the picture. For example, PART (of), CONTAINED (in) and FIXED (to) features merge
with PART (of) in nonspatial language, since certain topographical features of spatial objects do
not apply. MAP’s feature set and its application are discussed in detail in [Russell, 1992]. Current
(binary-valued) features are:
–
–
–
–
–
–

SHAPE (discrete vs. amorphous)
1-DIMENSIONAL (linear-like)
PART
COMPLEX
FLUID
ANIMATE (dynamic).

In addition, the FUNCTION of an artifact (or TYPICAL ACTION of a natural concept) is specified
in terms of an abstract verbal representation. While a specific function of an object represents world
knowledge, the concept of FUNCTION is basic to natural language processing in that it expresses
the commonly implied relationship between the object and its user.
6

That the meaning of a novel metaphor depends on its literal meaning does not necessarily imply that
literal meanings are always accessed before metaphoric ones by humans.

7.2

Paraphrase

If there happens to be a verb in the target domain that has an abstract representation in common
with the source or part of the source (at least the structure), then that verb can be included in
the paraphrase. For the example news torpedo his hope,7 given that the lexicon has a sufficiently
refined taxonomy of emotions, that verb might be ‘disappoint,’ which has the same structure as
the verb ‘torpedo,’ i.e., AGENT (or event) cause (the beginning of) NOT STATE (OBJECT BE),
where the OBJECT (‘hope’) is in the MENTAL-ATTITUDE domain. Remaining components (here,
this would be FORCE: HIGH, SPEED: HIGH, EVALUATION: NEGATIVE) would be lexicalized
directly. A more reliable though less interesting interpretation is given by direct lexicalization of all
components. In an “undoing” of reification in the current example, the reified abstract OBJECT
‘hope’ from the input is mapped to the verbal ‘hope’ (or the adjectival ‘(be) hopeful’) as part of
the paraphrase and the remaining components lexicalized. Three possible paraphrases, depending
on structure interpretation, are then:
from structure:
news disappoint him OR
news cause he stop hope OR
news cause he start he not be hopeful
from character of the action:
forcefully, suddenly, negative
Abstraction necessarily entails a loss of information, and the paraphrases produced often seem
inadequate in being too general, though “literal” and not wrong. The paraphrases appear, however,
to be close in content to the types of responses Gentner and France [Gentner and France, 1988]
observed empirically, which they classify as “minimal subtraction” (of meaning from the verbal
concept in its original sense). In any case, it was deemed important to start with a broad, non-ad
hoc framework, rather than to attend to target-domain detail.
The characterization of nominals for nominal metaphor interpretation is much more open than
for verbs, since objects can mean many things to many people. As the meaning of even one sense of
a nominal is less constrained than that of a verb, which has inherent structure, there are more possibilities for similarity-creating metaphors. For nominal metaphor, MAP transfers putative salient
properties of source nominals [Winston, 1978] [Russell, 1986], to the target. One of the most prominent properties of a nominal that enters into metaphoric interpretation is its FUNCTION (cf.
Gibson’s “affordances” [Gibson, 1977]) or TYPICAL ACTION as described above. This property,
like any verbal expression, can be represented in terms of the described ontological components.
As nominal metaphor typically involves extension of underlying verbal or attributive components,
a brief indication of nominal metaphor interpretation will serve to illustrate further representational
aspects of verbal metaphor as well. For the example Encyclopedias are gold mines: The abstracted
FUNCTION of ‘gold mine’ (one takes gold out of it) is defined in the lexicon with the resultant
STATE structure and connotation:
STATE: (OBJECT:(CONTROL of)gold AT LOCATION:<user>)
EVALUATION: HIGH
The conceptual domain of this FUNCTION, since possession and not simply location is involved, is
CONTROL, consistent with the OBJECT as shown. The abstract structure and the EVALUATION
are integrated into the FUNCTION predicate of ‘encyclopedia,’ (one reads it, i.e., takes information
from it), giving the new resultant STATE structure and connotation
STATE: (OBJECT:MENTAL-INTELLECTUAL AT LOCATION:<user>)
EVALUATION: HIGH
7

Irrelevant grammar-related elements are ignored in input and output examples.

where the OBJECT is specified only by its conceptual domain, MENTAL-INTELLECTUAL, which
is the domain of the target STATE itself. The entire paraphrase then is ‘One read encyclopedia has
result one has knowledge which-has high value.’
This example is of only average richness, but the added connotation of high value, along with
the lack of pre-existing literal similarity, makes it similarity-creating. A metaphor that is perhaps
more clearly similarity-creating is the metaphor Dumps are gold mines. Here the entire FUNCTION
structure of ‘dump’ (to put things into it rather than literally or metaphorically take them out) is
overridden; the interpretation is that something of extreme value can be found in dumps. Of note
is that in both cases the property of HIGH value, along with other factors such as connotations,
are culturally based and constitute the kind of information that Indurkhya [Indurkhya, 1992] claims
must be represented in meanings of objects if similarity-creating metaphors are to be interpreted
computationally. Nominal metaphor interpretations are considered to be only likely, not definitive,
since the writer/speaker may have wished to highlight some less obvious aspect of the source.
However, metaphors that have more obscure interpretations usually require further elaboration,
requiring multi-sentence analysis.
This approach appears to correspond with Indurkhya’s view of similarity-creating metaphor;
the source ontology is imposed on, as opposed to compared with, the target domain. Moreover,
cultural and experiential factors—the imagined experience which Indurkhya claims as missing from
computational treatments of metaphor—are included in the imposed concepts derived from the
abstract lexicon.
Following are sample paraphrases by MAP, showing both its ability to produce minimal interpretations and what refinements—if possible—need to be made.
sentence: he plow-through elizas proposal
interpretation: HE CONTINUOUSLY WITH-EFFORT READ ELIZAS PROPOSAL
sentence: he torpedo elizas proposal
interpretation: HE SUDDENLY CAUSE FORCEFULLY STOP ELIZAS PROPOSAL BE
sentence: eliza decorate idea
interpretation: ELIZA CAUSE START IDEA BE COMPLEX COMMA WITH POSITIVE CONNOTATION
sentence: country leap-to prosperity
interpretation: COUNTRY SUDDENLY START BE PROSPEROUS
sentence: he inhale idea
interpretation: HE START BELIEVE IDEA
sentence: he inhale discussion
interpretation: HE START PARTICIPATE-IN DISCUSSION
Some observations concern points that are minor but are relevant to representation and interpretation. For example, ‘with-effort’ and ‘forcefully’ both derive from a FORCE feature, but the
former applies (in the source representation) to the actor of the sentence, while the latter applies to
the “recipient” of action, i.e., an affected being. This type of difference also determines the placement in the output of adverbs derived from conceptual features; features applying to the actor are
placed soon after the occurrence of the actor, after any CAUSE element in the paraphrase. The
character of “abstract” OBJECTs, which are not all of the same conceptual category, and whether
an actor causes a change in vs. interacts with an object, are also examples of necessary grammatical
housekeeping that make a difference in the output phrasing.

8

Comparative Evaluation

While most computational approaches to metaphor do not address imilarity-creating metaphors, as
they are not based on a semantic analysis that allows ontological components to shape the target
domain, the following research has some aspects corresponding to aspects of MAP.
Martin’s [Martin, 1990] system is similar to Carbonell’s earlier work (see Section 3), with a
more comprehensive implementation. However, he has extended his system through a recognition
of the conceptual relationship between states and their beginnings and endings. These correspond
to MAP’s basic abstract structural components.
Carbonell and Minton [Carbonell and Minton, 1983] specify their method for metaphor interpretation in terms of transfer of portions of a graph consisting of concepts linked by relations. Thus for
X is a puppet of Y, the CONTROL relation between the object ‘puppet’ and the actor ‘puppeteer’
is transferred to the node between X and Y. This process and type of representation is similar to
that of MAP. However, a comprehensive representation system does not appear to exist, and they
do not incorporate affective or cultural components.
The idea underlying the verb representations of the system of Suwa and Motoda [Suwa and Motoda, 1991]
is perhaps the most similar to that of the verb representations of MAP. Their ontology itself does
not explicitly distinguish domains as in MAP and thus is not as transparent as MAP’s, but they
do use a finite, relatively small ontology consisting of what they call abstract primitives. These are
only in the form of verb structures, through which they match source and target verbs—a method
which apparently succeeds in an interpretation only if such a match exists. Experiential factors are
not incorporated. As it stands, then, their system does not address similarity-creating metaphor;
however, they discuss the addition of new components to the target and could in theory achieve
this, given their abstract ontology.
In the recent work of Barnden et al. [Barnden et al., 2003] [Barnden et al., 2004] and Agerri et.
al. [Agerri et al., 2007], it is acknowledged that many metaphoric usages are not adequately covered
by Lakoff’s conceptual metaphors. They present “view-neutral mapping adjuncts” (VNMAs), which
“transfer those aspects that are not part of any specific metaphorical view” or conceptual metaphor
[Agerri et al., 2007]. VNMAs appear to correlate with the structural metaphoric extensions of MAP,
and are applied as “default rules.”
The metaphor theory and attendant hypotheses underlying the system of Narayanan [Narayanan, 1999]
have significant similarities with MAP, though his model differs in his neural-like implementation.
As aspects of his theory in part apply to Barnden et al.’s and Agerri et al.’s work as well, it will
be discussed in somewhat greater detail. Narayanan’s treatment of nominals, verbs and adverbs in
verbal metaphor in terms of invariant components corresponds with that of MAP in at least two
ways. First, the prevalence of spatio-temporal structures as extensible to other domains is incorporated. (Narayanan proceeds further to establish correspondences between motion verbs expressing
such structures and possibilities as part of a sequence of actions and inferences leading to a goal
in a target domain.) Second, from looking at databases, Narayanan has concluded the invariance
of certain “parameters” which correspond to MAP’s adverbial features expressing evaluation, agent
attitude/intent and other (nongrammatical) aspects. His determination can be viewed as corroborating support for the inclusion of such features.
The fine granularity of Narayanan’s representation of his two target domains, e.g., economic
policy and politics is a positive feature, though the scope of his system is limited in breadth. While
Narayanan works out specific mappings to his target domains, MAP deals generally with metaphoric
extension between domains in a proposed domain ontology. MAP thus reveals how the representation
of a source domain concept in a sentence might structure a target concept in any other domain.
Another difference concerns the way in which source concepts are projected metaphorically
onto the target. In Narayanan’s system, entities and actions are projected directly through preestablished “conceptual metaphors” in the sense of Lakoff, such as MOVERS ARE ACTORS or
OBSTACLES ARE DIFFICULTIES, which must be stored. From the point of view of language
understanding, MAP shows how a metaphoric usage might be understood in terms of perceived

or imposed similarities represented by semantic components of literally understood lexical items,
whether the metaphor is conventional or creative, and whether stored or not. Apart from these
explanatory differences, Narayanan’s system for projecting verbal concepts has similarities in concept
to MAP, with more detailed paraphrases for the two domains he treats. The differences perhaps
reflect the differing intended tasks—narratives within a specific topic domain/discipline in the case
of Narayanan’s system, and spontaneous references to metaphor in open discourse in the case of
MAP.
In addition to a comparison of the various computational treatments of metaphor, it is of interest to consider how MAP’s components compare with those evolving from theoretical insights
on the relationship between syntax and semantics and between mathematical and nonmathematical
concepts. Jackendoff [Jackendoff, 1983] and Bouchard [Bouchard, 1995] differ significantly between
themselves with respect to the autonomy of semantics from pragmatics. This question aside, MAP,
like Jackendoff and Bouchard, aims for a certain level of “conceptual structure” that attends to putative cognitive constraints as well as linguistic phenomena that go beyond what is usually thought
of as literal.
MAP’s ontology is consistent with the criterion of Jackendoff that builds on the hypothesis of
Gruber [Gruber, 1965] in generalizing across modalities. MAP’s OBJECT, LOCATION and structural components in general accord with the key role of this hypothesis in the semantics of motion
and location. In MAP, the conceptual domain of a simple sentence is determined by the domain
of the nominal(s) it includes. Thus as in Jackendoff’s hypothesis, semantic fields differ only in the
nature of the OBJECT nominals that appear in the conceptual structures of events and states. This
element is also consistent with Bouchard’s view, in which different contexts give different meanings
to the use of the same verb.
Although the purpose of Bouchard—to unite semantics with grammatical constraints—differs
from that of MAP, MAP shows an analogy with his syntax-based model in that (in contrast to
Jackendoff’s cases) MAP has only one or two case-like entities—OBJECTs and LOCATIONs—in
the conceptual structure of a simple sentence. An example of MAP’s divergence from Bouchard in the
choice of representation components lies in Bouchard’s claim that to represent a verbal concept only
in terms of its cause and result omits any specification of an action that might be involved. However,
while MAP does not represent such actions as structural components, they are represented in terms
of salient conceptual features. While there is no claim that MAP’s features are complete, features
of this type may be sufficient for metaphor interpretation, whereas they might not be adequate to
represent all the details of literal language.
With respect to the place of metaphor in language, Jackendoff rejects the view that a crossmodal system makes metaphor possible, because metaphor is “artistic”—a characterization that is
at best dubious in light of the ubiquity of mundane metaphor, such as ‘break the law.’ Like Jackendoff, though from a different standpoint, Bouchard claims that his theory, which treats abstract
representation as central rather than as a medium of extension, accounts for various semantic fields
(domains) without recourse to metaphoric extension. He links his claim to his rejection of the centrality of space, saying that “concepts not directly grounded in experience are not any more abstract
than spatial notions like orientation” (p. 198). For example, Bouchard points out that a mental relation can be built on any verb expressing an abstract relation of contact. With the observation
left aside that “contact” appears to be at root a spatial concept, MAP’s assumption of the spatial
as a frequent source of extension does not imply centrality of space as he defines it (i.e., centrality
of space as requiring different primitives for different domains). In MAP’s lexicon, spatial senses
are defined abstractly as well; thus abstract primitives are unified across domains. MAP’s version
of Bouchard’s “abstract contact” (OBJECT AT LOCATION) could thus be thought of as applying
to (as an alternative to “extended to”) other domains, including the MENTAL domain. The principal difference is that Bouchard would derive a spatial sense from an abstract component, whereas
MAP as a natural language processor abstracts components from the literal sense. The focus on
abstraction and on the separation of abstract components from domains is essentially similar.

Aside from specific questions and purposes, then, I would agree with Bouchard, in divergence
from the semantic representations of most computational metaphor research, that “only semantic
representations based on sufficiently abstract notions are able to account for language use [and I
would add in particular for metaphoric usage] adequately” (p. 15).
Finally, it is such abstract notions that provide the most interesting connection between the
assumptions underlying the given ontology and the relationship of metaphor to mathematics in
cognition, as described comprehensively by Lakoff and Nuñez [Lakoff and Nunez, 2000]. The above
references to mathematics do not imply that mathematics is somehow objectively “true” or a priori
with respect to the ontology; in relating abstraction, metaphor and mathematics, I would accept the
assertion of Lakoff and Nuñez that mathematics derives from the human cognitive system, though no
specific cognitive claims are being made here. Their approach does differ in framing this derivation,
claiming that mathematics comes from conceptual metaphors, while the present discussion characterizes mathematics and metaphor as parallel instances of metaphor. In both approaches, however,
ordinary—especially spatial—ideas are seen as a grounding for metaphor and mathematics.
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Conclusion

Some metaphor programs other than MAP produce more detailed interpretations as a result of
being similarity-based or being restricted to certain domains. MAP on the other hand was designed
for scope rather than detail, not oriented to any specific examples or domains. Its focus on extensible components based on the semantics of the metaphorically used concept enables it to at least
minimally “understand” similarity-creating metaphors. The described ontology accounts for both
similarities (through extensible components) and differences (between conceptual domains) underlying cross-modal metaphor. Extensible components include not only structures but also connotations
and stereotypic experience, imposition of which is offered as an example of what Indurkhya calls a
re-structuring by projection of the source concept network onto the target realm. It would seem that
the computational interpretation of similarity-creating metaphors with cognitive relevance requires
either an abstract ontology of the type presented here or some implicit incorporation of its elements.
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